Will Russia invade Ukraine?

[BridgeTroll]

Private company assisting Ukraine...

“People’s Satellite” Helped Ukraine Hit Over 1,000 Targets Spy Agency Says

A crowd-funded satellite has enabled Ukraine to have a much better independent view of the battlefield, as well as targets in Russia.

HOWARD ALTMAN
POSTED ON JUN 26, 2024 8:18 PM EDT

https://www.twz.com/news-features/peoples-satellite-helped-ukraine-hit-over-1000-targets-spy-agency-says

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ICEYE

[BridgeTroll]

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c72ver6172do

A network of Russia-based websites masquerading as local American newspapers is pumping out fake stories as part of an AI-powered operation that is increasingly targeting the US election, a BBC investigation can reveal.

A former Florida police officer who relocated to Moscow is one of the key figures behind it...

[BridgeTroll]

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev reaffirmed that Russia would not accept or uphold any negotiated peace settlements with Kyiv short of Ukrainian capitulation, the destruction of the entire Ukrainian state, and the full occupation of Ukraine. Medvedev stated on July 10 that even if Kyiv agrees to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s most recent conditions for peace — namely recognizing Russia’s territorial claims over eastern and southern Ukraine, including territory that Russia does not currently occupy, and pledging not to join NATO — and signs documents resulting in Ukrainian surrender, these actions will not constitute the “end of the Russian military operation” in Ukraine.[32] Medvedev stated that even if Ukraine surrenders, Russia will eventually still need to destroy the remaining Ukrainian “radicals” and return “remaining [Ukrainian] lands to the bosom of the Russian land.” Medvedev also implied that Russian-Ukrainian negotiations will likely take place only after there is a radical change within the Ukrainian government and that this can only occur after Ukrainian society stages a “third bloody Maidan” revolution in response to a ceasefire agreement and Ukraine’s willingness to abandon prospects for NATO accession. Medvedev insinuated that the Kremlin plans to continue its conquest of Ukraine following a negotiated peace agreement. Medvedev’s argumentation also indicates that the Kremlin believes that the full conquest of Ukraine will be easier if Kyiv accepts deeply unpopular ceasefire agreements and concessions at the current stage of the war, in anticipation that Ukrainian society would demand a government change that could benefit the Kremlin. The Kremlin has misread domestic Ukrainian sentiment before, however. Ukrainian officials have long warned that the Kremlin launched an elaborate “Maidan 3” information campaign, which aims to undermine the Ukrainian government likely in order to trigger a government change and establish a pro-Kremlin government in Ukraine.[33]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2024

[Tacachale]

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev reaffirmed that Russia would not accept or uphold any negotiated peace settlements with Kyiv short of Ukrainian capitulation, the destruction of the entire Ukrainian state, and the full occupation of Ukraine. Medvedev stated on July 10 that even if Kyiv agrees to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s most recent conditions for peace — namely recognizing Russia’s territorial claims over eastern and southern Ukraine, including territory that Russia does not currently occupy, and pledging not to join NATO — and signs documents resulting in Ukrainian surrender, these actions will not constitute the “end of the Russian military operation” in Ukraine.[32] Medvedev stated that even if Ukraine surrenders, Russia will eventually still need to destroy the remaining Ukrainian “radicals” and return “remaining [Ukrainian] lands to the bosom of the Russian land.” Medvedev also implied that Russian-Ukrainian negotiations will likely take place only after there is a radical change within the Ukrainian government and that this can only occur after Ukrainian society stages a “third bloody Maidan” revolution in response to a ceasefire agreement and Ukraine’s willingness to abandon prospects for NATO accession. Medvedev insinuated that the Kremlin plans to continue its conquest of Ukraine following a negotiated peace agreement. Medvedev’s argumentation also indicates that the Kremlin believes that the full conquest of Ukraine will be easier if Kyiv accepts deeply unpopular ceasefire agreements and concessions at the current stage of the war, in anticipation that Ukrainian society would demand a government change that could benefit the Kremlin. The Kremlin has misread domestic Ukrainian sentiment before, however. Ukrainian officials have long warned that the Kremlin launched an elaborate “Maidan 3” information campaign, which aims to undermine the Ukrainian government likely in order to trigger a government change and establish a pro-Kremlin government in Ukraine.[33]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2024

There’s no negotiating with these nutjobs. Only clear and embarrassing defeat for Putin followed by NATO membership for Ukraine will keep Russia from further attacks.

[BridgeTroll]

They have NO intention to negotiate in good faith. Any ceasefire or “peace “ will be followed by more aggression after they reconstitute and regroup. Complete capitulation is what Putin requires.  Sell/give Ukraine the weapons to win.

[BridgeTroll]

Very little news of this anywhere... as always ISW provides insight...

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2024

Ukrainian cross-border mechanized offensive operations into Kursk Oblast that began on August 6 are continuing as part of a Ukrainian operational effort within Russian territory. ISW will not offer assessments about the intent of this Ukrainian operation in order to avoid compromising Ukrainian operational security. ISW will not make forecasts about what Ukrainian forces might or might not do or where or when they might do it. ISW will continue to map, track, and evaluate operations as they unfold but will not offer insight into Ukrainian planning, tactics, or techniques. ISW is not prepared to map control of terrain within Russia at this time and will instead map observed events associated with the Ukrainian incursion into Russian territory as well the maximalist extent of claims and unverified reports about Ukrainian advances. Maximalist claims and unverified reports about Ukrainian advances within Russia do not represent territory that ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces have seized or control. Inferring predictions about Ukrainian operations from ISW maps and assessments that do not explicitly offer such predictions is inappropriate and not in accord with their intended use.

(Detailed map of Ukrainian offensive. )
https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/UAF%20Kursk%20Incursion%20August%208%2C%202024.png

Geolocated footage and Russian claims indicate that Ukrainian forces continued rapid advances further into Kursk Oblast on August 8, and Ukrainian forces are reportedly present in areas as far as 35 kilometers from the international border with Sumy Oblast. Ukrainian forces most certainly do not control all of the territory within the maximalist extent of Russian claims about Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast, however. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced as far as Kromskiye Byki and Molyutino (up to 35 kilometers from the international border and 17 kilometers southeast of Lgov) but noted that these are small groups not immediately trying to hold territory.[1] Russian milbloggers issued contradictory claims about Ukrainian positions in Sudzha (northeast of Sumy City and roughly 10 kilometers from the international border), with some milbloggers claiming that Ukrainian forces seized the settlement while other milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces only seized part of the settlement.[2] Geolocated footage published on August 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces likely advanced towards Russkoye Porechnoye (north of Sudzha), and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces also advanced further north of Sudzha along the 38K-024 highway near Anastasyevka.[3] Geolocated footage published on August 7 and 8 shows Ukrainian forces operating within Goncharovka (just west of Sudzha) and north of Zaoleshenka (northwest of Sudzha), and a Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Goncharovka.[4] A geolocated photo shows Ukrainian forces operating within Novoivanovka (10km north of the international border and northwest of Sudzha), and Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Novoivanovka and Bogdanovka (northwest of Sudzha).[5] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces also advanced northwest of Sudzha into Malaya Loknya and to the outskirts of Cherkasskoye Porechnoye; northeast of Sudzha near Kruglenkoye, Martynovka, and Bolshoye Soldatskoye; and east of Sudzha near Mirny, although two Russian milbloggers denied claims that Ukrainian forces are operating near and within Bolshoye Soldatskoye.[6] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Korenevo (north of Sumy City and roughly 23 kilometers north of the international border) and that Ukrainian forces attacked within Snagost (south of Korenevo) and near Olgovka (east of Korenevo).[7]

Russian milbloggers claimed that small Ukrainian armored groups are advancing further into the Russian rear and bypassing Russian fortifications before engaging Russian forces and then withdrawing from the engagements without attempting to consolidate control over their furthest advances.[8] Russian milbloggers noted that the prevalence of these armored groups is leading to conflicting reporting because Ukrainian forces are able to quickly engage Russian forces near a settlement and then withdraw from the area.[9] Ukrainian forces appear to be able to use these small armored groups to conduct assaults past the engagement line due to the low density of Russian personnel in the border areas of Kursk Oblast. Larger Ukrainian units are reportedly operating in areas of Kursk Oblast closer to the international border and are reportedly consolidating and fortifying some positions.[10]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are successfully fielding novel and innovative tactics and technological capabilities during operations in Kursk Oblast. Russian milbloggers have provided details on Ukrainian tactics and technological capabilities that they regard as innovative, but ISW will not describe such details at this time or point to specific sources in order to preserve Ukrainian operational security.

The Kremlin will almost certainly endeavor to retake Russian territory in Kursk Oblast that Ukrainian forces have seized and stop Ukrainian activity further into Russia, as substantial Ukrainian advances within Russia would be a strategic blow to Russian President Vladimir Putin's decades-long effort to cement a legacy of Russian stability, security, and geopolitical resurgence. Putin held a virtual meeting with Kursk Oblast Acting Head Alexey Smirnov on August 8 about Ukraine's operations into the oblast and stated that he "generally know the situation" but still would like to hear Smirnov's assessment of the situation.[11] Smirnov and Putin did not discuss Russian attempts to repel Ukrainian forces and portrayed the Russian government as effectively working to ensure civilian safety and social and monetary compensation. Russian milbloggers have highlighted concerns over the safety of Russian civilians and disorganized civilian evacuations.[12] Putin likely assesses that he must respond to the perceived threat to civilians in order to assure the Russian public that the situation is under control and avoid significant domestic discontent. Smirnov claimed on August 7 that the situation is "under [Putin's] personal control," directly linking Russian success in repelling Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast and mitigating related civilian issues to Putin.[13] The Kremlin previously has portrayed itself as capable of swiftly responding to pro-Ukrainian raids into Russia, and the Kremlin likely assesses that significant Ukrainian territorial gains in Russia would pose a threat to the Kremlin's efforts to frame itself as a stable regime in control of the internal security situation within Russia and an effective manager of the war in Ukraine.[14]

If Russian reporting on the situation in Kursk Oblast is accurate and if the Russian military command perceives the situation to be the same as Russian sources have described, then the Russian military command has an array of likely courses of action (COAs) it could pursue to respond to the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast. ISW is not prepared at this time to assess which of these possible COAs is most likely, and it is possible that the Russian military command may not rely on only one COA to respond to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. The Russian military command's decision-making will be influenced by its perception of the size and capability of Ukrainian forces in the area, about which ISW makes no assessment. The following COAs are not presented in order of likelihood.

(Go to article to read entire COA assessments)

COA 1: The Russian military command may decide to use existing conscripts, Federal Security Service (FSB) border guards, Rosgvardia, and other irregular forces already deployed to the international border area to push Ukrainian forces back and defend against the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast.

COA 2: The Russian military command may decide to use the existing Northern Grouping of Forces deployed along the Russian-Ukrainian border to respond to the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast.

COA 3: The Russian military command may choose to redeploy operational reserves that it accumulated for its planned Summer 2024 offensive effort and/or relatively better provisioned and more combat effective frontline units to Kursk Oblast from elsewhere in the theater.

COA 4: The Russian military command may seek to maintain the forces it currently has committed to Kursk Oblast but could redeploy significant aviation and strike elements to the area in an effort to improve Russia's ability to retake territory.

The lack of a coherent Russian response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and the reported rate of Ukrainian advance indicates that Ukrainian forces were able to achieve operational surprise along the border with Russia. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces have struggled to achieve operational surprise in the past year and a half of fighting due to the partially transparent battlefield in Ukraine. Ukraine's ability to achieve operational surprise highlights that the widespread visual and sensor-based transparency that both sides have established does not translate into a fully transparent battlefield, however, and that the belligerents in Ukraine can leverage ambiguity around operational intent to achieve operational surprise. One Russian milblogger criticized the Russian military command for failing to observe and react to Ukrainian forces allegedly massing on the border near Kursk Oblast.[28] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continually warned the Russian high command about a massing of Ukrainian forces along the border near Kursk Oblast but that the Russian command failed to adequately prepare for potential Ukrainian offensive operations.[29] Ukrainian forces would have successfully concealed their operational intent in order to achieve operational surprise if milblogger claims that Russian forces observed a buildup of Ukrainian forces in border areas are accurate. ISW has previously assessed that Russian forces have failed to internalize lessons learned about the difficulties of mechanized maneuver on an assumed transparent battlefield in Ukraine.[30] Ukraine, however, appears to be learning and adapting to this aspect of the battlefield given its ability to achieve apparent operational surprise in this instance.

Ukrainian officials have yet to comment directly on Ukraine's ongoing operation into Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on August 8 that Russia "brought the war to Ukraine" and must "feel what it has done" in response.[31] Advisor to the Head of the Ukrainian President's Office Mykhaylo Podolyak acknowledged the ongoing "events" in Kursk Oblast and noted that Russia is to blame for the situation, and an unnamed advisor to Zelensky also acknowledged the ongoing Ukrainian military operation into Kursk Oblast during an interview with the Washington Post on August 8.[32]

US officials noted that Ukraine's ongoing operation into Kursk Oblast is not a violation of US restrictions on Ukraine's ability to strike military targets within Russia's border areas. Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh stated during a press briefing on August 8 that Ukraine's operation into Kursk Oblast is consistent with US policy and that the US supports Ukraine's right to defend itself against attacks across the international border.[33] White House Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller also noted the Biden Administration's support for Ukraine's "common sense" and defensive actions on August 7.[34] Unnamed "US and Ukrainian officials" told CNN on August 8 that Ukrainian forces hope to disrupt and demoralize Russian forces and partially divert Russian forces from frontline areas in eastern Ukraine.[35]

 

[scbennett67@gmail.com]

My guess is that Russia will invade Ukraine let's see if I'm right.

[BridgeTroll]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2024

Putin offered several assessments about Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast, including one that undermined a long-standing Kremlin information operation falsely portraying Ukraine as unwilling to engage in legitimate, good-faith negotiations and putting the onus for peace negotiations on Ukraine. Putin claimed that Ukraine is "indiscriminately strik[ing] civilians, [striking] civilian infrastructure, and threaten[ing] nuclear power facilities" and implied that Russia cannot conduct good-faith negotiations with an actor who commits such actions.[9] Putin unironically but hypocritically accused Ukraine of striking civilians and endangering the nuclear power plants — actions that ISW has thoroughly documented Russia committing in Ukraine with strikes against civilian targets since the start of the full-scale invasion and the endangerment of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) since the Russian military occupied it in March 2022.[10] Putin also claimed, however, that Ukraine may be conducting operations into Kursk Oblast in order to "improve its negotiating position in the future."[11] Putin's assessment inherently implies that Ukraine is interested in negotiations — undermining the Kremlin's ongoing attempts to portray Ukraine as unwilling to negotiate. Putin also claimed that Ukraine may be conducting operations into Kursk Oblast to prevent Russian advances in eastern Ukraine and to destabilize the Russian domestic political situation. Putin notably did not present one assessment of Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast as more likely than another and did not present them as mutually exclusive. ISW will not offer assessments about the intent of Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast or Putin's claims of Ukrainian intent.

[BridgeTroll]

Click the link for entire article.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putin-vulnerable-western-policy-masks-russian-weakness

Putin Is Vulnerable: Western Policy Masks Russian Weakness

Aug 14, 2024 - ISW Press

Putin Is Vulnerable: Western Policy Masks Russian Weakness

By Nataliya Bugayova
August 14, 2024

Russia has vulnerabilities that the West has simply not been exploiting. On the contrary, US incrementalism has helped the Kremlin offset and mask its weaknesses...

Russia depends on the will of others more than many people realize. A lot of Russia’s capability to sustain the war in Ukraine is not inherent and is, therefore, vulnerable. The Kremlin acquired some of its capabilities by force, manipulation, or by exploiting Western resources and sanctuaries. Russia depends on basing in Belarus to attack Ukraine from the north. Russia depends on foreign trade routes and intermediaries to smuggle sanctioned goods.[13] Russia depends on foreign machinery and components to produce advanced weapons.[14] Russia depends on North Korea and Iran to offset shortages in materiel.[15] Russia depends on ‘shadow fleets’ to transport its energy.[16] Russia depends on Western media to cycle its false narratives. Russia depends on continued US will to grant Russia a safe space, from which Russia can strike Ukraine with impunity — without being struck back by Ukraine with long-range US-provided systems.[17] The Kremlin depends on continued Western choice not to expel the Kremlin’s agents of influence and revenue, like Russia’s state nuclear operator Rosatom.[18]

Above all, the Kremlin depends on the West’s accepting Russia’s fabricated assertions about reality, which often cause the West to reason to conclusions that advance Russia’s interests and not ours.[19] Key examples include the false assertion that Russia has the right to a self-defined sphere of influence, and, therefore, a right to do whatever it wants to those within this sphere — including invading — with no repercussions. Another example is a false assertion that any provision of advanced military capability to Ukraine is a red line that will result in a nuclear escalation, and therefore, the US should de facto grant a veto to any nuclear power over US national security policy. Kremlin’s strategy in Ukraine disproportionately depends on the West accepting these premises, making Russia vulnerable to changes in Western perceptions. Russian dependencies give the West opportunities to exploit or dismantle Russia’s capability to sustain the war against Ukraine.

Western strategy should focus not only on imposing multiple dilemmas on the Kremlin but also on imposing the most painful ones. First, Russia’s military failures are a lynchpin that makes other actions to degrade Russia’s military capability more effective. Helping Ukraine restore maneuver to the battlefield, building on momentum afforded by Ukraine’s operation in Kursk, and reinforcing the already successful efforts to demilitarize Crimea are therefore strategic, not only operational, priorities.[39] The United States can help Ukraine do so by opening all legitimate military targets within Russia for strikes with US weapons; increasing the speed and scale of capability deliveries to Ukraine; and surging US and partner defense production to sustain the momentum of capability deliveries to Ukraine. Second, Putin's center of gravity is his ability to shape the will and decisions of the West, Ukraine, and Russia itself.[40] The US must adopt a strategy to persistently dismantle the Kremlin-generated alternative reality that helps Russia advance in the real world.

[BridgeTroll]

https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2024/09/17/russian-election-interference-efforts-focus-on-the-harris-walz-campaign/

The shift to focusing on the Harris-Walz campaign reflects a strategic move by Russian actors aimed at exploiting any perceived vulnerabilities in the new candidates. Initially, Russian influence operations struggled to evolve their efforts following President Biden’s departure from the 2024 US presidential race. However, in late August and September, we observed two Russian actors MTAC tracks closely — previously reported as Storm-1516 and Storm-1679 — using videos designed to discredit Harris and stoke controversy around her campaign. Specifically:  

Storm-1516, identified by news reports as a Kremlin-aligned troll farm, produced and disseminated two inauthentic videos, each generating millions of views. One video depicted an attack by alleged Harris supporters on a supposed Trump rally attendee, while another used an on-screen actor to fabricate false claims about Harris’s involvement in a hit-and-run accident. This second video was laundered through a website masquerading as a local San Francisco media outlet — which was only created days beforehand. Storm-1679, a newer group reportedly aligned with the Kremlin, pivoted its focus from producing content about the 2024 Paris Olympic Games to publishing false videos discrediting Vice President Harris. One of the videos, which was shared on X shortly after it was published to Telegram, depicted a fake New York City billboard advancing false claims about Harris’ policies. The X post received more than 100,000 views in the four hours after it was published on Telegram. 

[BridgeTroll]

Interesting article...

https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-anti-war-tiny-protest-figures-ukraine/33145753.html

[BridgeTroll]

https://cepa.org/article/moldova-time-to-choose-moscow-or-brussels/

Moldova — Time to Choose Moscow or Brussels

Moldova’s election and referendum will determine whether it cements its path to Europe or falls back under Moscow’s shadow.

By Anda Bologa

October 9, 2024

 

[BridgeTroll]

Comprehensive analysis of lessons learned in Ukrainian conflict that should be applied in a future conflict in Taiwan with emphasis on the rapidly changing innovation in drone warfare and long range missile strike.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/defense-taiwan-ukrainian-characteristics-lessons-war-ukraine-western-pacific

A Defense of Taiwan with Ukrainian Characteristics: Lessons from the war in Ukraine for the Western Pacific

By Riley Bailey and Frederick W. Kagan

October 30, 2024

Executive Summary

The war in Ukraine offers many important lessons for the defense of Taiwan against possible aggression by the People’s Republic of China. The obvious differences between the theaters and the combatants must not be allowed to obscure the important changes in the character of war manifested in Ukraine that will likely apply to almost all future major conflicts. Some lessons will apply directly, since a successful amphibious invasion ends in ground combat. Others require abstraction and major adaptation. But the PRC is studying the war and drawing its own conclusions about how to prepare for future conflict in the western Pacific, and it behooves the United States, Taiwan, and our allies and partners to do the same.

The Ukraine war is demonstrating dramatic changes in the character of war in five main ways:

1) The effectiveness of integrated air/missile defense (IAMD) against even intensive and complex air/missile attack (a phenomenon also visible in Iranian attacks against Israel);

2) The ability of enormous masses of tactical drones—millions of drones used on both sides—to create partially transparent battlefields and constrain combat to positional forms;

3) The ability of integrated drone-missile attacks including both aerial and maritime drones to achieve mission kills and even catastrophic kills of major and minor surface combatants;

4) The expansion of electronic warfare (EW) capabilities to scales and effects never before seen in combat; and

5) The emergence of an extremely rapid battlefield technological-tactical innovation cycle, driven largely by a race between drone and EW technologies, that can see major changes implement along a thousand-kilometer frontline in as few as two-three weeks.