Chinese fighter intercepts Navy Poseidon

[BridgeTroll]

https://warontherocks.com/2024/05/by-with-and-through-at-the-second-thomas-shoal/

[BridgeTroll]

Very long but if you are interested in geopolitics this is a fantastic read...

https://tnsr.org/2024/05/confronting-another-axis-history-humility-and-wishful-thinking/

[BridgeTroll]

https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/products/Safeguarding_Our_Military_Expertise.pdf
A document from US, UK, Australian, Canadian, New Zealanders intelligence...

[BridgeTroll]

Philippines promises to protect fishermen as China’s trespass rule takes hold
A new regulation says the Chinese coast guard can arrest foreign vessels and crew in waters claimed by Beijing.
By BenarNews staff
2024.06.14

https://www.rfa.org/english/news/southchinasea/protect-fishermen-trespassing-06142024141311.html

[BridgeTroll]

https://ejfoundation.org/reports/tide-of-injustice-exploitation-and-illegal-fishing-on-chinese-vessels-in-the-southwest-indian-ocean#:~:text=This%20report%20maps%20the%20presence,coastal%20communities%20across%20its%20shores.

TIDE OF INJUSTICE: EXPLOITATION AND ILLEGAL FISHING ON CHINESE VESSELS IN THE SOUTHWEST INDIAN OCEANPUBLICATION DATE  11-04-24 TYPE  REPORT

This report maps the presence and activities of the Chinese DWF in the Southwest Indian Ocean (SWIO), a region notable for its biodiversity-rich seascape, which is a lifeline to coastal communities across its shores. The findings of the report show that while couched in terms of win-win, sustainable development and collective benefits from the blue economy, the realities on board many vessels in China’s DWF are in direct contradiction of these stated aims.

[BridgeTroll]

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-south-china-sea-matters-211730

Clashes between the China Coast Guard and the Philippine Navy escalated in June. Philippine officials announced late last month that Chinese personnel attacked dinghies attempting to provision Philippine troops at the disputed Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea.

If China succeeded in dominating the South China Sea, the consequences would be immense: Beijing could potentially choke off trade and shipments to Japan, control access to technologies crucial to U.S. economic activities (especially microchips), and project power deep into the Pacific.

The economic significance of the South China Sea cannot be overstated. As one of the busiest maritime routes in the world, it serves as a vital artery for international trade, facilitating the flow of 64 percent of total goods discharged worldwide in 2022. Any disruption to the free passage of ships through these waters would have far-reaching consequences for the global economy, affecting not only the countries directly involved in the dispute but also the broader international community.

Any attempt by China to restrict access or assert control over the South China Sea would directly impact U.S. economic interests, potentially leading to higher shipping costs, supply chain disruptions, and increased market volatility. South China Sea trade accounts for 5.72 percent of all trade in goods for the United States. Safeguarding freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is essential to protecting American prosperity and maintaining its leadership role in the global economy.

While neighboring countries adhere to their internationally recognized Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) for their maritime claims, China asserts sovereignty over a broad swathe of ocean in the South China Sea encompassed by the “nine-dash line.” In 2016, an international tribunal in The Hague ruled against China’s claims, stating that it cannot claim rights to resources in the South China Sea that lie within the EEZs of other coastal states like the Philippines and Vietnam. China rejected the ruling and promptly threatened military force against Vietnam for drilling within its EEZ.

In March of this year, two Philippine naval ships and two coastguard vessels were escorting a civilian boat hired to resupply troops at the Second Thomas Shoal. A Chinese coastguard vessel and two maritime militia vessels encircled the Filipino troops, using water cannons that damaged the civilian boat and harmed crew members. Following several of these encounters, the Philippines has lodged diplomatic protests in Beijing and appealed to the United States for an increased U.S. military presence in the Philippines.

The best way for America to prevent China from seizing control of the South China Sea is to strengthen its own ability to deter China while working with others in the region who feel threatened by the Chinese, including Taiwan, the Philippines, and Vietnam, as well as other states in the broader Indo-Pacific who have an interest in maintaining a free and open South China Sea, like Japan, Australia, South Korea, and India.

The Chinese Communist Party is the odd man out here, pushing for a redefinition of treaties and rebalancing of regional power at the expense of most of its neighbors. The U.S. military’s deterrent effect on the Chinese attempt to establish hegemony in the South China Sea and the Indo-Pacific more generally serves the national security interests of both the United States and the overwhelming majority of countries in the Indo-Pacific.  

[BridgeTroll]

https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2024/08/20/2003822498

China’s Taiwan strategy would use three carriers

ACCESS DENIAL: Beijing would likely take formation in the Philippine Sea, outside Taipei’s missile range, while its forces on the east would be a deterrent to foreign aid

By Chen Yu-fu and William Hetherington / Staff reporter, with staff writer

China is increasingly likely to employ a strategy of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) around Taiwan, which would use three carrier groups, a report from the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) said.

When China’s third aircraft carrier, the Fujian, is completed next year, China would have three carriers, which would likely be used to surround Taiwan and implement an A2/AD strategy, it said, adding that efforts to strengthen China’s two other carriers — the Liaoning and the Shandong — appear to corroborate this.

In the quarterly report, the council cited declassified documents from the Ministry of National Defense that categorized China’s carriers as a threat if used for A2/AD, and said that China might coordinate its naval, air force and rocket force capabilities to operate beyond the first island chain and deter foreign forces from getting involved in a conflict involving Taiwan.

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force would deploy medium and long-range conventional ground-attack and anti-ship ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles to foreign forces in the area between the first and second island chains, it said.

Citing military researchers, the report said that in the event of an attempted invasion of Taiwan, Chinese forces would likely first take formation in the northern part of the Philippine Sea, somewhere between 300km and 800km east of Taiwan proper. This posture would allow China to face Taiwan simultaneously on two fronts, with forces east of Taiwan also acting as a deterrent to foreign forces, it said.

Separately, Institute for National Defense and Security Research fellow Su Tzu-yun (蘇紫雲) on Sunday said that China’s three carriers are part of China’s transition from a land power to a sea power.

The introduction of the Fujian into service would help make the PLA Navy a “blue water navy,” and allow China to more effectively encircle Taiwan, he said.

The range of Taiwan’s Xiangfeng missiles is 200km to 250km, so China’s carriers would be deployed 300km or more east of Taiwan, putting them out of range, he said. Meanwhile, the range of the fighter jets that would be deployed from the carriers is about 800km, so an attack on Taiwan could be launched from within a safe range.

Taiwan can use anti-ship missiles to attack approaching enemy ships, but must rely on submarines to deal with long-distance aircraft, he said, adding that domestically-built submarines are important.

In the event of a war, it would be difficult for Chinese aircraft to safely pass through the Bashi Strait or Miyako Strait, he said, adding that if the US were to help Taiwan, China’s aircraft carriers in waters east of Taiwan would be “sandwiched” between attacks from both sides.

Within the strategic triangle comprised of Hawaii, Guam and Taiwan, Chinese carriers would become the target of the US military, he said.

“Thoughts to the contrary are simply wishful thinking on the part of the Chinese,” he said.

Chinese aircraft carriers stationed east of Taiwan during an attack would also be subject to a war of attrition since they would need supplies within one to two weeks, he said.

“Since the passage of supply ships through the Bashi Channel or Miyako Strait would be too dangerous, and China has no overseas bases, supplying the carriers would be impossible,” he said. “Any advantage brought by the carriers would be quickly lost.”

[BridgeTroll]

Taiwan, South China Sea, India are just the beginning...Russia beware...

https://www.derpragmaticus.com/r/china-russland-gebietsansprueche

late August, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is expected to publish an updated version of its "standard map" to reflect its growing territorial claims. Its neighbors see it as an ominous sign of China's imperialist threat. But for the party, it is a near-sacred document that embodies China's historical claims and vision of which lost territories must be reclaimed. All of this is under the banner of "national rejuvenation" - a central concept of Xi Jinping that aims to restore the country as a dominant superpower by the People's Republic's centenary in 2049.

In the current version of the standard map, published last year, eight Russian cities along the Sino-Russian border were suddenly given their Chinese names. Vladivostok is called "Haishenwai." Khabarovsk, Russia's easternmost city, is called "Bólì." Bolshoi Ussuriysky - Hiexiazi Island in Chinese - which is supposedly used jointly by Moscow and Beijing, is described as purely Chinese. China's "national rejuvenation" would be incomplete without the territories once lost to Russia.

[BridgeTroll]

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/09/uscg-pacific-comments-latest-chinese-ramming-of-philippine-coast-guard-vessel/

USCG Pacific Comments Latest Chinese Ramming of Philippine Coast Guard VesselChina, despite its protestations of innocence, is the South China Sea’s greatest source of instability. This was illustrated on 31 August when China Coast Guard (CCG) vessel ‘5205’ deliberately collided with a Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) vessel several times near Sabina Shoal, 75nm from the Palawan coast. The Philippines deployed a ship there in April after China furtively attempted to develop it into an artificial island.

Gordon Arthur  02 Sep 2024

This was the fifth time in a month that China had confronted Philippine law enforcement agencies within the country’s own EEZ, as China goes all out to push the Philippines away from this shoal and others. The presence of two naval tugboats suggested China might even have been contemplating towing the Philippine vessel away after immobilising it.

China says its actions are “‘professional, restrained and appropriate”, whereas the majority recognise them as unprofessional, dangerous and inappropriate. For example, the New Zealand Embassy in Manila stated, “This latest incident, with a CCG vessel ramming a Philippine vessel, is profoundly troubling and fits a recent pattern of dangerous and destabilising actions in the region. New Zealand calls for de-escalation and compliance with international law, in particular UNCLOS.”

The USA vocalized its condemnation too. Rear Admiral Andrew M. Sugimoto, Deputy Commander, US Coast Guard (USCG) Pacific Area, said:

“We unequivocally condemn the ramming of vessels. The whole point of rules on the water is so that we don’t run into each other, and so this is a clear act of bullying by one individual that wants to exert its influences over another nation with complete disregard for the rules and the international law that exists.”

RADM Sugimoto, who was promoted to his post in July, asked which international rules condoned ramming as a measure for upholding international law, especially when collision regulations are designed to prevent vessels from hitting each other. “So it’s a little astounding to say that I’m going to break the law in order to uphold the law. It just doesn’t make sense, and I think most nations out there see that as unsafe and unprofessional conduct, which only highlights and further emphasises the bullying that is going on, right?”

[BridgeTroll]

Watch the video... released by the Chinese... pretty clear who the aggressor is...

https://twitter.com/i/status/1834581288596152634

[BridgeTroll]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-october-4-2024

The Wall Street Journal reported that US investigators are investigating a hacking campaign by PRC state-sponsored threat actors that infiltrated US-based internet service providers (ISP) to conduct espionage.[10] Investigators are calling the campaign Salt Typhoon, following the Microsoft naming convention for cyber threat actors attributed to the PRC. Salt Typhoon is also known as GhostEmperor and Famous Sparrow, according to Microsoft’s cybersecurity division.[11] PRC-based threat actors’ access to US ISPs and telecommunications companies. Gaining access to the digital infrastructure of ISP and telecom companies would position PRC-based threat actors to steal sensitive data and potentially affect the flow of internet traffic.

Estonian cybersecurity research firm ESET discovered the threat actor, which it named FamousSparrow, in 2021 after observing activity that targeted hotels, engineering companies, and international and government organizations in 12 countries worldwide, including Taiwan.[12] Russian cybersecurity research firm Kaspersky publicized other malicious activity from a Chinese-speaking threat actor that it called GhostEmperor a week later.[13] Kaspersky linked GhostEmperor to FamousSparrow based on a common IP address across the activity in both companies’ investigations. Kaspersky reported that the threat actor infiltrated government entities and telecommunications companies in Southeast Asia and suggested geopolitically motivated espionage as a possible purpose, based on the targets.

The Salt Typhoon revelations follow a September 18 cybersecurity advisory from the US and UK that revealed an extensive botnet under the control of PRC state-sponsored cyber threat actor Flax Typhoon. The botnet infected over 260,000 small office/home office (SOHO) routers and internet-linked devices worldwide, almost half of which were in the US.[14]

Former US Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) suggested that the threat actor could be Advanced Persistent Threat 40 (APT40), another cyber threat actor that the Five Eyes, Germany, South Korea, and Japan have attributed to the PRC Ministry of State Security (MSS) Hainan branch.[15] The Wall Street Journal reported that Salt Typhoon’s focus on intelligence collection is notably different from other assessed PRC state-sponsored threat actors such as Volt Typhoon. The Five Eyes countries issued a joint advisory on February 7 that exposed Volt Typhoon’s targeting of critical infrastructure in the United States.[16] The Five Eyes countries assessed that the purpose of this campaign was to develop the capability to disrupt key operational technology functions in the event of a conflict with the United States by leveraging its access to informational technology environments. 

[BridgeTroll]

https://www.businessinsider.com/sweden-probes-chinese-ship-severed-baltic-sea-cables-report-2024-11

[BridgeTroll]

https://cepa.org/article/stakes-rise-in-baltic-sabotage-standoff/

So what happened? First, two undersea data cables near the Swedish island of Öland were cut within 24 hours of each other, on or around November 17-18. Open source analysts noted the Yi Peng 3 had crossed both and appeared to slow down as she did so. The two links connected Sweden and Lithuania, and Finland and Germany. In one place at the bottom of the Baltic Sea, the two cables nearly intersected, and it turned out their sudden dysfunction had no natural or engineering explanations: it must have been caused from outside... 

[BridgeTroll]

The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) jointly announced that the “Salt Typhoon” breach that infiltrated several telecom providers as well as both the Republican and Democratic presidential campaigns remains unresolved and was greater in scope than officials had previously known. President Biden’s Deputy National Security Adviser for Cyber and Emerging Technology Anne Neuberger said at least eight US telecom providers had been breached, four more than previously known.[60] Moreover, investigators now understand that Salt Typhoon has exploited vulnerabilities and penetrated systems in at least a “couple dozen” countries.[61] The agencies stated that although they had not announced the breach until September this year, Microsoft first detected it in late spring or early summer and likely tipped off the relevant telecom providers.[62]  ISW has previously reported that Salt Typhoon could be a campaign by APT40, a highly sophisticated group associated with the Hainan branch of the PRC Ministry of State Security (MSS).[63]

Although officials from the respective agencies have not observed new activity by Salt Typhoon since they last put out an announcement about it on November 13th, they maintained the possibility that the threat group has decided to lie low with the intention to reemerge after the investigation passes.[64]  Officials identified three main target types: an unspecified number of victims in the Washington DC area whose call records were taken from telecom companies, a limited group of individuals with political or government connections—each of whom the FBI has notified, and Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement (CALEA) statute program court orders that could contain Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) investigation sources.[65]  The official neither confirmed nor denied that Salt Typhoon hackers had uncovered FISA sources, which would pose a dire risk for the latter while helping PRC informants avoid detection.[66] CISA’s Executive Assistant Director Jeff Greene also noted that the extent and method in which each victim was compromised varies significantly, making expulsion of Salt Typhoon all the more complicated.[67]  U.S. Senator Mark Warner (D-Virginia) cautioned that eliminating PRC hackers from US networks could necessitate physically replacing thousands of obsolete routers and switches.[68]

CISA and several partnering Five Eyes agencies jointly released an alert warning that PRC threat actors had infiltrated the networks of major telecom providers and a set of guidelines for hardening their infrastructure. Notably, they did not include British agencies, which Greene said operated on “different considerations and timelines.”[69]  Greene also recommended that Americans use encrypted messaging apps over SMS to reduce Salt Typhoon’s ability to intercept data in transit.[70]

Telecom providers are among the most valuable targets for a nation state actor interested in espionage to hack. They offer unparalleled visibility into who the providers work with and their customers’ data and metadata, especially where messages are unencrypted.[71] Salt Typhoon has managed to exploit a vast array of outdated network of routers and switches built decades ago by many companies that no longer exist.[72]

The PRC’s export controls on critical minerals will inhibit the United States’ access to materials that are essential to economic and national security. The PRC prohibited exports to the United States of gallium, germanium, antimony, and superhard materials on December 3.[73] The PRC also implemented stricter controls on exports of graphite to the United States.

The US Department of Interior designated antimony, gallium, germanium, and graphite as critical minerals to the economy and national security in 2018.[74] Antimony has a variety of military applications, including night vision goggles, strengthening shielding materials, explosives, flares, nuclear weapons, and infrared sensors.[75] Gallium and germanium have applications in aerospace, military, and telecommunications due to their use in the manufacture of optoelectronic devices and fundamental inputs such as integrated circuits, semiconductors, and transistors.[76] Graphite has extensive industrial and military applications, including the manufacture of missile guidance systems, artillery components, firearms, and military aircraft.[77] Superhard materials, such as diamond, are used for their hardness and durability for precision manufacturing of goods such as semiconductors and electronics.[78]

The PRC is a top producer and source of imports for all of the critical minerals that are subject to new restrictions. The United States has not mined gallium since 1987, antimony since 2001, graphite since the 1950s, and produces minimal germanium.[79] The United States’ annual demand for some of the minerals, such as antimony, exceeds any other single country’s mine production.[80]

The United States’ stockpile of antimony amounted to 1,100 tons in 2023, compared to its consumption of 23,000 tons, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies.[81] A Department of Defense spokesperson stated in July 2023 that the United States has a strategic stockpile of germanium but did not specify the size. The spokesperson stated that the United States does not have a stockpile of gallium.[82] The United States also does not have a stockpile of graphite.[83]

The export restrictions follow a pattern of the PRC’s increasing securitization of critical minerals. The PRC previously implemented export controls for gallium and germanium in August 2023, high-grade graphite in December 2023, and antimony in September 2024.[84] A PRC Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) spokesperson accused the United States on December 3 of “politicizing and weaponizing economic, trade, and technological issues, abusing export control measures, and arbitrarily restricting the export of relevant products to China.”[85] The PRC announced the measures a day after the United States Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) implemented new export control measures to restrict the PRC’s ability to produce semiconductors.[86]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-december-12-2024